Which law schools are worth attending? Part II

Just over six years ago, Old Guy posted his first article here to answer an important question: which law schools are worth attending? Using a simple but reasonable model and the data supplied by our friends at Law School Transparency, he concluded that 13 schools—Berkeley, Columbia, Chicago, Cornell, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, NYU, Penn, Stanford, Virginia, Yale—were "the only ones that anyone not independently wealthy should consider". Just maybe the total could be raised to 16 by including three marginal schools that people paying little or nothing might consider as long as they understood that "they [were] taking a big risk".

This recent report by Andrew Gillen of the Texas Public Policy Foundation revisits Old Guy's question. Pointedly entitled "Objection! Law schools can be hazardous to students' financial health", the report assessed law schools' performance and relative value by applying "a debt-to-earnings test called Gainful Employment Equivalent (GEE)" (at 1) to data from the US Department of Education. Of the 218 law schools (not all accredited), 168 had publicly available data; the others were so small that the Department of Education concealed their data so as to protect the privacy of students and graduates (at 2).

How many schools met Gillen's standard? Exactly as many as Old Guy cited in his more generous estimate: "of the programs with data, only 16 (10%) law schools pass GEE, with another 30 (18%) on probation. A shocking 122 (73%) law school programs fail GEE. Thus, almost three quarters of law school programs leave their typical student borrower with a debt so high relative to their post-graduation earnings that they are unlikely to be able to afford to make their student loan payments" (at 2).

The following are the schools that passed GEE (at 5–9):

• Berkeley
• Boston College
• Chicago
• Columbia
• Connecticut
• Harvard
• Iowa
• Michigan
• Northwestern
• NYU
• Penn
• Stanford
• Texas
• Vanderbilt
• Virginia
• Washington University in St Louis

This list will surprise the esteemed readers of Outside the Law School Scam for including several mediocre institutions while omitting some well-regarded ones. Most of the mediocrities barely scraped through. As for the missing élite institutions, please note that Cornell, Duke, and Yale were omitted for want of data, probably because relatively few of their graduates took out student loans.

Since Gillen's data come from 2015–16, the report amusingly includes the über-toilets that have shut down since that academic year, the first of which was Indiana Tech.

Gillen aptly observes that "only 15% of law school graduates attended a program that passed GEE. Another 17% attended a program on probation [by the Department of Education]. An astounding 68% of law school graduates attended a program thath fails GEE, indicating that the typical graduate ho borrowed will be unable to afford their student loan payments. In other words, for every law school graduate from a passing program, there was one graduate from a program on probation, and four graduates from a failing program" (at 2).

A glance at the five-page list of law schools shows that debt, where reported, is typically well past $100k. The following had median debt in excess of $185k (and remember that this was five years ago): Florida Coastal ($198,655), Whittier ($196,008), Thomas Jefferson ($195,892), Southwestern ($193,653), Arizona Summit ($188,191), Charlotte ($188,985). Small wonder that four of these six are defunct (well, Thomas Jefferson still operates, just without ABA accreditation) and that at least one of the others has one foot in the grave. In the department of earnings, the long-reported bimodal pattern stands out in sharp relief: 7 schools have median earnings above $150k, 19 have median earnings below $40k, and most of the rest seem to be close to the lower end (perhaps below $55k).

Unsurprisingly, high debt often accompanies low earnings. Of the six mentioned above where median debt exceeds $185k, the highest median earnings were $45,200 (at Arizona Summit, in case you care to know). Arithmetic could not have informed many decisions to enroll at über-toilets where the median debt is more than four times the median earnings.

Old Guy is grateful for Gillen's effort but wishes to point out that median earnings at the time of graduation are unlikely to last: even those few who get jobs paying $150k or more are likely to lose those jobs within three or four years—and find themselves unable to make comparable money again. Borrowing $183,857 to go to NYU, or $129,030 for Vanderbilt, is likely to turn out badly when the income that supports the high payments proves temporary. In addition, the median figures may be misleading. Harvard's median debt of $133,617 may appear manageable, but remember than many students get the entire cost paid from a trust fund or a parent's bank account and thus do not borrow anything, while many others borrow all or nearly all of the cost and thus run up a debt in the vicinity of $362k at graduation (figure from Law School Transparency). Debt around $362k is unaffordable even on a median income of $158,200. Similarly, median earnings often conceal a great deal of variation—especially at the bottom end, with quite a few graduates being unemployed or making little money at a temporary, part-time, or non-legal job.

Old Guy therefore stands by his original list. Perhaps Vanderbilt can be appropriately added (it was one of the three marginal candidates on Old Guy's extended list of sixteen schools), and Old Guy is willing to entertain arguments on behalf of Boston College, Connecticut, Iowa, Texas, and Washington U, especially for applicants receiving a full scholarship. Gillen and Old Guy differ on three or four schools (presumably he would accept Cornell, Duke, and Yale even though their data are not public), which is to say that they substantially agree—and that should come as no surprise, since their analyses are based on relevant facts and logic, not on arbitrary "rankings" by some long-defunct magazine or propaganda from admissions offices or pie-in-the-sky fantasies by lemmings who expect to achieve a financially successful career even though most new JDs today do not.

Although we can argue about the merits of individual law schools, the key point is that only about one school in twelve works out adequately for the median student when we generously and unrealistically assume that income shortly after graduation will not decline until the student loans are paid off. Anyone considering a law school can start with Old Guy's list or Gillen's (the latter should be supplemented with Cornell, Duke, and Yale) but must perform the financial analysis in light of individual circumstances. Perhaps UCLA on a full scholarship wouldn't be a horrible idea for you even though Harvard with no scholarship—and no trust fund or benefactor—would be. 

Gillen's final paragraph (at 4) can appropriately end this article as well: "Among the riskiest of the largest academic fields is law. Seventy-three percent of law schools fail these debt-to-earnings tests, and 68% of law school graduates attended a program that fails. Students should think twice about enrolling in one of these failing programs, and policymakers should stop providing taxpayer subsidies for them."

Three million readers

As the column to the right shows, OTLSS has been visited more than three million times. Thanks to our many allies in the battle against the law-school scam.

People have pointed out that OTLSS appears to be the last of the scam-blogs and that we have been publishing less and less. Old Guy does what he can to sustain the last major source of information on the law-school scam. Times have been difficult for most of us (Old Guy by no means excluded), and the dearth of news on law schools—other than a few recent closures—has contributed to a decline in our anti-scam journalism. We remain vigilant, however, and shall continue to provide the news, analysis, and activism that you have rightly come to expect.

Projects for the new year include a fresh analysis showing which schools may be worth attending and a summary of the data from the ABA's 509 disclosures, which were just released.

We at OTLSS thank you for your continued support and wish you happy and scam-free holidays.

Cooley dumped by Western Michigan University

In an apparent bid to lift itself out of the bottom of the shitter, Cooley affiliated itself with Western Michigan University in 2014. Recently Western Michigan decided to dissolve this ill-advised marriage in November 2023.

Western Michigan was gracious enough to utter a few pieties about returning to its core mission (Cooley was specifically identified as "a distraction"), and it conveniently blamed COVID-19 for the downfall of its bonds to that laughing-stock of law schools. Astute observers of the law-school scam, however, will perceive a different motive behind the propaganda. However much the partnership may have improved Cooley's reputation, it only tarnished Western Michigan's. Cooley indeed has been closing campuses, and it also is at risk of losing its accreditation. How could Western Michigan have gained from that deal? 

Recent months have seen little news here at OTLSS. Stay tuned, however, for a report on the celebrated OTLSS question of whether law school is worth attending at all.

Cooley closes another campus

Cooley, which once rated itself the second best law school in the US, is closing another campus. The one in Grand Rapids will be gone at the end of the month.

Allegedly the closure of one more campus places Cooley "in a position of strength". If it is so damn strong, why has it closed three campuses in the past few years? Cooley's president blamed COVID-19 and changes in the demand for law degrees, without ever mentioning the utter shittiness of his über-toilet. Yale, which Cooley left in the dust on the widely ridiculed Cooley rankings, managed to increase its first-year enrollment by 4% in precisely the same context. How is it that Cooley shrank by 46%? Might it be that something other than external factors contributed significantly to Cooley's fate?

Cooley has recently failed to meet one of the ABA's standards for maintaining accreditation. In practice, the ABA can be expected to extend the time for achieving compliance, which is a polite way of saying that it will not meaningfully enforce its own so-called standards.

The number of law schools that have closed in the past five years or so now stands at thirteen:

Cooley (one campus)
Hamline or Mitchell*
Indiana Tech
Whittier
Charlotte
Savannah
Valpo
Arizona Summit
Cooley (a second campus)
Thomas Jefferson†
La Verne†
Concordia
Cooley (a third campus)

Which school will be the next to close? Florida Coastal and Appalachian are strong contenders. Not far behind are Mississippi College, Golden Gate, Ohio Northern, Faulkner, Western State, District of Columbia, John Marshall, Vermont, and a number of others. Step right up and place your bets!

NOTES:

* Hamline and Mitchell merged. Which one closed is difficult to say: arguments can be made on each side. Anyway, the two schools became one, so effectively one of the two closed. The merger was a closure in dignified guise.

† Forfeited ABA accreditation and continued with only the accreditation offered by California.

Concordia University's law school closes after all

Only four months ago, Concordia University's law school in Boise, Idaho, announced that it would be acquired by Concordia University in St Paul, Minnesota. Now the deal has fallen through, and Concordia's law school will not be opening this autumn after all. Count one more law school as dead.

Although the institutions involved decline to provide details, it seems that a $300M lawsuit against the parent university (based or formerly based in Portland, Oregon) resulted in liens that blocked the transfer of the law school's assets. The parent university recently announced its own closure, but of course its assets may still have to answer that nine-figure claim and possibly other claims as well.

Anyone interested in keeping Concordia's law school alive might consider raising money with which to settle or at least secure that claim. A bake sale should do the trick: just make a dollar's profit by selling a carrot cake or a plate of brownies (or red-velvet cupcakes for Lisa Tucker McElroy) to every person in the US! We have helpfully offered numerous other ideas for bailing a law school out. Indiana Tech never tried them, but maybe Concordia can succeed.

Our dear friends at Law School Transparency have already stricken Concordia from their database, so I cannot provide a link to their data. But the entering class of 2019 had only 59 students, and Concordia was definitely deep in über-toilet territory. It achieved ABA accreditation just last year.

What shall become of those 145 Concordians who have been left high and dry? The U of Idaho has tentatively offered to take them in, one and all, if only it can find a place for them. Options include moving them all to the university's own law school (far away in Moscow, Idaho) and cobbling together a temporary place for them at the university's facilities in Boise. Expect plenty of other toilet institutions to come begging for the newly scuppered Concordians, much as the U of North Dakota scooped up much of the jetsam of Arizona Summit when the latter went tits up days before classes were supposed to start.

Twelve law schools have closed in the past few years (if we count campuses of the Cooley chain as separate law schools) or at least forfeited their ABA accreditation in lieu of closing for good:

Cooley (one campus)
Hamline or Mitchell*
Indiana Tech
Whittier
Charlotte
Savannah
Valpo
Arizona Summit
Cooley (another campus)
Thomas Jefferson†
La Verne†
Concordia

Which will be next?


NOTES:

* Hamline and Mitchell merged. Which one closed is difficult to say: arguments can be made on each side. Anyway, the two schools became one, so effectively one of the two closed. The merger was a closure in dignified guise.

† Forfeited ABA accreditation and continued with only the accreditation offered by California.

ABA notifies ten law schools of non-compliance with Standard 316

Recently we reported that eleven law schools are out of compliance with the ABA's Standard 316. That standard, introduced in its current revised form in May 2019, nominally requires that "[a]t least 75 percent of a law school's graduates who sat for a bar examination must have passed a bar examination administered within two years of their graduation". The non-compliant schools are

Faulkner
District of Columbia
Mississippi College
Inter-American (Puerto Rico)
Cooley
South Dakota
Florida Coastal
John Marshall–Atlanta
Florida A&M
Pontifical Catholic (Puerto Rico)
Charleston

In May 2020, the ABA sent letters of non-compliance to all of these but Faulkner. (I have not found an explanation for the failure to call Faulkner out, even though it had the lowest percentage of graduates who took and passed a bar exam.) Those law schools must now produce a report by February 2021 and appear before the relevant council of the ABA in May 2021. The report must present "a reliable plan for coming back into compliance within [a] 2-year period" starting from the date of the letter (in this case May 2020). "The school returns to compliance by showing that a subsequent two-year cohort has a 75% ultimate pass rate"; otherwise "the school’s accreditation will be removed … unless an extension of time is requested by the school and granted by the Council for good cause shown".

This weak standard was adopted despite the militant opposition of the law-school scamsters and their lackeys, who did not want to have their good thing spoiled by even minimal requirements. Note some of the weaknesses of the standard:

1) Schools that have had perfectly dreadful results on the bar exam for years—including all eleven of the schools listed above—still get the full opportunity to improve their results. In the meantime, they continue to draw in new classes of lemmings, few of whom are likely to pass a bar exam ever.

2) The standard refers to "coming back into compliance", but quite a few schools have never been in compliance.

3) Only those graduates "who [have] sat for a bar examination … within two years of their graduation" are considered for the purposes of this standard. A law school can thus manipulate the data by discouraging its least promising graduates from taking any bar exam within two years of graduation, so that their expected failure will not count against the law school. It is well known, and has been reported here, that law schools have resorted to bribery and other corrupt tactics in order to keep students from taking a bar exam.

4) Likewise, a law school could simply reduce enrollment for a couple of years in order to reach the 75% threshold. Many law schools have resorted to this tactic, especially in recent years, so as to seem more competitive or selective than they are.

5) A law school can also turn its curriculum into little more than three years of bar review. Already that is reality at many law schools, despite the pretensions to "global leadership", flashy specialties, scholarship, complex litigation, and so on. Quite a few law schools have formal bar-review courses every semester, and the rest of the curriculum too is effectively more bar review. The ABA prates about rigorous programs of legal education but does little to evaluate, still less to regulate, what is actually done at toilet law schools.

6) The two-year period "for coming back into compliance" can be extended as the ABA sees fit.

7) If a law school fails to achieve compliance within the two-year period or any longer period allowed by the ABA, it can get a further "extension of time", perhaps indefinitely.

8) The ABA affords a full year between the notice of non-compliance and the evaluation of the school's plan for achieving compliance. Throughout that year, the school is free to do as it pleases.

9) The ABA does not say what it will do if the presented plan is deemed unsatisfactory. More extensions? Opportunities to try again?

10) Nothing in this standard stops a law school from manipulating its way into compliance only to fall back into its usual über-toilet practices immediately until slapped on the wrist again for non-compliance. This yo-yo cycle could continue forever.

So what will happen to the ten law schools whose accreditation has been called into question on account of Standard 316? A few of them are so shriveled up or financially threatened that they are likely to fail before the two-year period lapses. The ABA knows this, of course. As for the rest, I expect them to receive the sweetheart treatment from the ABA, which never saw a scam school that it didn't like. Maybe the ABA will feel the need to strip one or two dying schools of their accreditation just for the sake of appearances, to create a veneer of seriousness about upholding standards or policing the law-school scam. It has done the same in recent years to a couple of schools that had one foot in the grave anyway. But what about the rest of the schools? Will they not get extensions and other dispensations until they attain the pitifully low 75% threshold?

On-line instruction: boon or bane to the law-school scam?

Faithful readers, we are still here. We have been relatively quiet only because there has been little news to report on the law-school scam, thanks in large measure to the disruption resulting from COVID-19.

One new development is the shift to on-line instruction. Since March, on account of the virus, law schools have closed their campuses and switched to lectures delivered via the Internet. Harvard recently announced that it will do the same for at least one more semester, once classes resume in the autumn.

What does this development mean for the law-school scam? The very viability of teaching law in this way casts doubt upon the putative need for expensive buildings, libraries, and, above all, faculties of overpaid professors. Now that the entire student body at Harvard can complete a semester from Paducah, Peoria, or Phnom Penh without getting dressed, why not complete all of law school in the same way? And if students can do so with nothing but some Internet-based lectures, can Harvard not slash its faculty and support staff? The lectures themselves can just be recorded once and for all; students anywhere can attend them at their convenience. A few adjuncts can be hired to grade exams on the side.

It might be argued that the students have to write a paper or two, using the library's resources, or perhaps conduct a moot. But that doesn't justify three years on campus: the students can just show up for a couple of weeks and stay at a hotel if necessary while they do the little bit of work that must be performed on site.

Harvard has long been regarded as the bellwether of the law-school scam: what Harvard does, every über-toilet is sure to imitate. (For instance, every über-toilet teaches law as if its charges were slated for Global Leadership™ or litigation before the Supreme Court.) Now that Harvard can operate entirely via the Internet, other law schools will do likewise. And why shouldn't they? Why maintain the costly, old-fashioned mode of instruction when a cheap and efficient substitute can be rolled out even at Harvard?

The implications for the law-school scam are harder to predict. On the one hand, the widespread introduction of on-line instruction may shore up many a toilet law school by facilitating enrollment. Students no longer need feel constrained by geography: wherever in the world they may live, one toilet is accessible as another. That fact may foster competition among toilets, but it may also help them to put lemming asses into virtual seats. On the other hand, the on-line medium will sap law school of much of its mystique and prestige, thereby discouraging many a prospective student. And even some of the thickest lemmings may call into question the fancy price tags attached to JDs. That could drive the cost down significantly.

Will COVID-19 prove to be good or bad for the law-school scam? Share your thoughts below.